In placing capital market imperfections at the center of emerging market crises, the theoretical literature has associated a liquidity crisis with low foreign investment and the exit of investors from the crisis economy. However, a liquidity crisis is equally consistent with an inflow of foreign capital in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). To support this hypothesis, we use a firm-level dataset to show that foreign acquisitions increased by 91% in East Asia between 1996 and 1998, while intra-national merger activity declined. Firm liquidity plays a significant and sizeable role in explaining both the increase in foreign acquisitions and the decline in the price of acquisitions during the crisis. This contrasts with the role of liquidity in non-crisis years and in non-crisis economies in the region. This effect is also most prominent in the tradable sector.
Introduction
There is a growing theoretical literature that places capital market imperfections at the center of emerging market crises. A deterioration in access to liquidity is shown to induce and exacerbate a real crisis in emerging markets, even in the absence of a shock to fundamentals. 1 This literature associates liquidity crises with low foreign investment and an exit of investors from the crisis economy. However, an equally plausible consequence of a liquidity crisis would involve the buy-out of domestic firms by foreign firms. This option, while raised in earlier work, is not the primary focus of recent crisis models and has not been subject to formal empirical investigation. 2 In this paper, we empirically investigate the behavior of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), both domestic and foreign, in East Asia during the crisis of 1997-98. We find that M&A activity is consistent with the tightening of liquidity constraints for domestically owned firms.
Specifically, nations suffering dramatic reversals in portfolio equity and debt flows simultaneously experience an increase in foreign acquisitions, particularly of liquidity constrained firms, a phenomenon we describe as fire-sale foreign direct investment (FDI).
Since the reversal of capital flows constitutes the defining feature of recent crises in emerging markets, understanding the behavior of these flows is crucial to identifying the precipitating shocks. Any such analysis needs to confront the surprising stability of foreign direct investment inflows into emerging markets during crisis years, a sizeable component of which are M&A's. 3 This stability in FDI contrasts with the sharp reversals in portfolio flows and bank lending (see figure 1) .
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by deriving testable implications for the behavior of mergers and acquisitions in response to a deterioration in liquidity. For this purpose, 1 See Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000), Chang and Velasco (2001) , and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) . 2 The possibility that firms were being sold at a discount due to illiquidity was raised early on by Krugman (1998) based on anecdotal evidence on acquisitions. 3 M&A as a percentage of FDI inflows ranged from 12% for Malaysia to 73% for South Korea in the late 1990s. These percentages were noticeably higher during the crisis in East Asia.
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we introduce a stylized model of foreign acquisitions in emerging markets. An important assumption we make is that during a crisis foreign firms bring access to greater liquidity than would otherwise be available to the acquired firm. We argue that foreign ownership brings transparency, relationships, and management that help bridge the gap between emerging markets and deeper overseas financial markets. Such benefits are unlikely to result from portfolio flows due to the small and dispersed nature of portfolio transactions. The premise that a large foreign ownership stake mitigates capital market imperfections therefore implies an important distinction between portfolio capital and FDI.
To test the predictions of the model, we employ a firm level dataset on mergers and acquisitions that records all cross-border and within-country mergers and acquisitions from 1986 through 2001. The dataset includes firm level financial characteristics of the target firm and acquisition prices, providing us with a rich information set to analyze acquisition behavior. The empirical literature on cross-border mergers and acquisitions has been essentially limited to developed country capital markets. In an influential paper, Froot and Stein (1991) use aggregate data to explore the role of real exchange rate changes in explaining the increase in FDI into the U.S in the 1980's. Blonigen (1997) focuses on the real exchange rate to explain the sectoral pattern of Japanese acquisitions of U.S. firms. Related to fire-sales, Pulvino(1998) uses a novel dataset to investigate liquidity-induced sales in the U.S. aircraft industry. This paper presents the first detailed empirical study of mergers and acquisitions in emerging markets.
The results of our empirical analysis are presented in Section 3. We find that the number of foreign mergers and acquisitions in East Asia increased by 91% between 1996
and the crisis year of 1998. Significantly, over the same period, domestic mergers and acquisition declined by 27%. In support of the liquidity hypothesis, we find that the effect of liquidity (proxied by cash flow, cash stock and sales) on the probability of being acquired changes significantly during the crisis year. While during non-crisis years high cash flow and sales has an insignificant effect on the probability of being acquired, in 1998 additional cash implies a lower probability of acquisition. A natural prediction of the model is that 3 liquidity constraints should have a greater impact on firms in high-growth sectors. While the large real devaluation of East Asian currencies in 1997-98 and the simultaneous collapse of the domestic economies limited the cash flow of firms in the nontradable sectors, they also severely reduced the firms' investment opportunities. Correspondingly, we find liquidity effects to be more prominent in the tradable sectors. Our estimates indicate that the decline in firm liquidity between 1996 and 1998 can account for 25% of the observed increase in acquisition activity in the tradable sectors.
In regard to the price paid for an acquired firm, the median ratio of offer price to book value declined from 3.5 in 1996 to 1.3 in 1998. In support of the hypothesis that cashstrapped firms sell at a steeper discount during a liquidity crisis, cross-sectional regressions find that an additional dollar of cash has a larger impact on sale price in 1998 than in other years. In fact, the elasticity of price-to-book with respect to cash flow is roughly 0.7 in 1998 while negligible during the other years of the sample. Further, this elasticity is higher (1.12) for firms acquired in the traded sector.
We divide our sample into sub-periods to determine the role of liquidity over time and find that liquidity effects are significant and sizeable only in 1998. Given that liquidity shocks are typically thought to be short-lived, we argue this is further support for the liquidity-sale hypothesis. We also find that liquidity considerations were more important in driving foreign-domestic acquisitions than domestic-domestic acquisitions, consistent with our underlying premise regarding the advantages of foreign ownership. Lastly, as a further test of our methodology, we estimate the role of liquidity in Singapore and Taiwan (Asian economies that were not subject to large capital account reversals in 1997-98) and find no evidence of liquidity based fire-sales in these economies.
In Section 4, we discuss other plausible interpretations of the evidence. One explanation based on the predominant shock being a decline in firm productivity (without a more significant decline in liquidity) would be consistent with the decline in the average sales price of acquired firms. However, it would be inconsistent with all other evidence regarding the number of acquisitions, the responsiveness of the probability of acquisition and the 4 price of acquisition to changes in liquidity that we identify. A second plausible explanation based on regulatory changes introduced during the crisis is consistent with the rise in the aggregate number of foreign acquisitions during the crisis. Consequently, to identify the role played by liquidity we exploit the cross-sectional variation using firm-level data. This allows us to isolate the effects of liquidity after controlling for any regulatory change at the industry level. Finally, hypotheses regarding cash flow as a proxy for omitted firm fundamentals have difficulty explaining the fact that high cash flow lowered the probability of being acquired in 1998 while simultaneously increasing the premium paid for the firm.
Empirical Hypotheses
This section presents a simple two-period model to spell out intuitively robust implications of a liquidity crisis. The goal of the model is to formalize testable predictions regarding the behavior of foreign acquisitions during a liquidity crisis.
The model makes a distinction between foreign ownership and domestic ownership.
A domestic firm that is acquired by a foreign firm is assumed to gain access to superior technology and deeper credit markets. The first distinction is a mild technology spillover assumption that requires that the merged/acquired firm realize productivity gains. Spillovers to other firms are assumed to be zero. This assumption is consistent with Aitken and Harrison (1999), who find positive productivity gains from foreign direct investment but little impact on other domestic firms. Goldberg (2004) surveys the empirical evidence on FDI and identifies a consensus in support of direct productivity spillovers. 4 The second distinction rests on the premise that capital markets are deeper in industrialized countries and firms that are headquartered in such markets have greater access to outside funding. In our sample, 89% of the foreign acquisitions during the crisis period where by firms headquartered in high income countries (as defined by the World Bank), and for the sample as a whole that number is 82%. Our empirical hypotheses therefore include 4 See also Blomstrom and Wolfe (1989) for evidence of general productivity spillovers in Mexico.
5 the assumption that foreign firms have greater access to liquidity as compared to domestic firms during crisis periods. 5 There is growing empirical support that foreign ownership plays a positive role during crises. For example, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2003) find affiliates of US firms invest more than domestic firms during and after a currency crisis. In further support of our premise, they also find that the US parent increases direct financing of its subsidiaries following a crisis. Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2003) find that in Indonesia only exporters with foreign ownership increased investment significantly during the crisis, which is consistent with our differential liquidity constraint assumption.
While we do not model portfolio investment explicitly, we make an important distinction between FDI and portfolio investment. We presume that it is the large ownership stake associated with FDI that mitigates capital market imperfections. Portfolio investment being small and anonymous does not overcome the liquidity constraint. As indicated in Table 1 , the median shares acquired by foreign firms is 50% in our sample.
At the start of period one, a domestically owned firm, j, is characterized by an initial capital stock K j,1 , a borrowing constraintD j , and period-one profits π j,1 . In period 1, the firm chooses its optimal investment, I, subject to the borrowing constraint and anticipated period-two productivity, A j,2 (we assume perfect foresight). Firms are price takers and the price of additional capital is normalized to one. Any differences across firms in the price of output are folded into A j,2 (in particular, the differential impact of a real devaluation across firms will be captured by differences in A j,2 , as explained in Appendix B). To simplify expressions, we assume that the interest rate and discount rate are zero.
The value of a firm under domestic ownership, V D , can then be expressed as (dropping subscript j):
5 There are numerous theoretical models that provide microfoundations for borrowing constraints, such as imperfect and asymmetric information (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) for a survey of capital market imperfections and macroeconomics). As the goal of the paper is not to add to this already large theoretical literature, we will take as given that firms may face a borrowing constraint and this constraint is tighter for emerging market firms, especially in crisis periods.
where The value to a foreign owner, V F , of the same firm is given by
where φ > 1 captures the superior productivity associated with foreign ownership and foreign owners are not subject to a borrowing constraint. 6 Clearly, V F > V D , ∀j. However, the transfer of ownership to the foreign acquiror entails a fixed reorganization cost γ. A foreign firm then acquires a domestic firm as long as the acquisition generates a positive
If acquired, the price paid for the firm is determined according to a Nash-bargaining solution :
where β ∈ (0, 1) captures the domestic owners bargaining power and V D is the outside option for the domestic firm. 7 The extent to which the value of the firm under domestic 6 We assume no constraint on foreign ownership's debt, but the important point is that the foreign firm enjoys a higher debt limit than the domestically owned firm. 7 Recall that the zero outside option for the foreign investor is only a simplifying assumption. all else equal. Firms that lie above this line will be acquired. For high enough A 2 , a domestic firm will be acquired regardless of liquidity due to the superiority (and complementarity with A 2 ) of foreign technology. As we reduce available liquidity for a given A 2 , a domestically owned firm will eventually become constrained and have to forego profitable investment opportunities. This widens the gap between V F and V D , making the acquisition efficient. 8 In regard to price, an increase in A 2 , all else equal, increases V F more than V D due to the superior technology employed by foreign ownership. This raises the surplus of the acquisition and therefore increases the price of the acquired firm. Similarly, extending additional liquidity to a constrained firm increases V D , reducing the gap between V F and V D and raising the acquisition price. Of course, to an unconstrained firm additional liquidity has zero effect on the acquisition surplus.
Liquidity Crises and Testable Implications
Conceptually, we consider a liquidity crisis as a ceteris paribas decline in liquidity available to domestically owned firms. That is, conditional on firm characteristics, domestically owned firms as a group find it difficult to borrow during the crisis. 9 Specifically, let G 0 (l) denote the benchmark or "normal-period" cumulative distribution of liquidity, conditional on A 2 , γ and other firm-specific characteristics, which we summarize as "θ". If G 1 (l) is the equivalent distribution during a liquidity crisis, then our definition implies that G 0 "first order stochastically dominates" (fosd ) G 1 .
Let N i denote the fraction of firms acquired under G i , i = 0, 1, where 1 is the crisis distribution. That is,
where H is the distribution of firm characteristics (A 2 , γ, θ).
Proof: Let 1 {x} equal one if x is true and zero otherwise. Then
Conditional on other firm characteristics, 1 {S≥0} is nonincreasing in l. The definition of
Integrating over other firm-specific characteristics preserves this inequality, implying that N 0 ≤ N 1 . The intuition is straight forward: as more firms become constrained, more firms will be willing to pay the cost γ to gain access to foreign liquidity.
One regression we consider below involves the probability of acquisition conditional on observable firm characteristics. We take the cost of reorganization γ to be the source of unobserved, idiosyncratic variation across firms. 10 That is, if y = y(l, A 2 , θ) denotes the 9 We do not model the origins of this capital market imperfection and why it may have been exacerbated in 1997-1998, but instead derive its implications for cross-border acquisitions. 10 In this section, we treat γ as orthogonal to other firm characteristics. In the empirical work, we control for underlying firm characteristics by including firm fixed effects.
probability of acquisition conditional on firm characteristics and γ ∼ Γ(γ), then y = R S≥0 dΓ. Recall that additional liquidity (to a constrained firm) lowers S while increased productivity increases the surplus of an acquisition. This implies:
The population averages of the partial derivatives in (6) are obtained by taking expec- 
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 states that, on average, additional liquidity has a more negative impact on the probability of acquisition during a liquidity crisis. Similarly, the sensitivity of the probability of acquisition to firm productivity increases during a liquidity crisis.
As noted in the introduction, Froot and Stein (1991) Appendix B provides a detailed analysis of the effect of real exchange rate movements on π 1 and A 2 . In particular, a real depreciation is likely to lead to an increase in investment opportunities and profits for tradable sector firms, and vice versa for nontradable firms. As the incidence of acquisition turns on whether firms are constrained relative to investment opportunities, the net effect is ambiguous and is therefore an empirical question. However,
given that sales take time to adjust to relative prices (as in the standard "J-curve" of trade theory), it seems plausible that a real depreciation will find tradable firms' future prospects expanding faster than current profits. The preceeding propositions would then suggest that the effect of liquidity will be strongest in the tradable sector.
In terms of the price of an acquisition, a liquidity crisis will lead to a fall in the average price of the domestic firm. That is, constrained firms have a less valuable outside option
, all else equal, and thus a lower price. The more constrained firms in the population, the lower the average price. Moreover, liquidity influences the surplus of an acquisition only if the domestic firm is constrained. Thus, the average sensitivity of price to liquidity increases during a liquidity crisis. Conversely, an increase in A 2 has a limited impact on V D if a firm is constrained as it cannot make full use of the improved productivity. As the sensitivity of V F to A 2 remains the same regardless of domestic liquidity, the average price of an acquired firm is less sensitive to growth prospects during a liquidity crisis. Specifically:
Given the above discussion, the empirical predictions of a liquidity crisis can be summarized as follows.
(i) The number of acquisitions increases during a liquidity crisis;
(ii) On average, the sensitivity of the conditional probability of acquisition to firm liquidity declines (becomes more negative) during a liquidity crisis;
(iii) On average, the sensitivity of the conditional probability of acquisition to future productivity increases during a liquidity crisis;
(iv) The average price of an acquisition declines during a liquidity crisis;
(v) On average, the sensitivity of the price of an acquisition to firm liquidity increases during a liquidity crisis;
(vi) On average, the sensitivity of the price of an acquisition to future productivity declines during a liquidity crisis.
Empirical Results
Our empirical work focuses on five East Asian nations: South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. These were the nations hit hardest by the Asian crisis of 1997. Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998)) provide a detailed account of the crisis that was characterized by a dramatic reversal of short-term capital flows from these economies.
Thailand abandoned its currency peg in July of 1997, followed by devaluations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and South Korea. We begin our sample in 1986 and include all mergers and acquisitions through the end of 2001. In total, we have close to 6,000 completed deals, roughly one third of which involve a foreign acquiror. Forty-five percent of deals involve a private target, with publicly traded firms and subsidiaries accounting for a quarter each. The remainder consists of government firms (1%) and joint-ventures (4%). Many of the regressions below require income statement and balance sheet data that are unavailable for privately held firms.
Data
Therefore, the regression samples are weighted towards publicly traded firms.
We take the announcement date as the date of the merger or acquisition. Table 1 reports the distribution of the shares involved in cross-border acquisitions. The median purchase involves 49% of the firm, with over a quarter involving the entire firm. Ten percent of the deals fall short of meeting the usual FDI definition of 10% of outstanding equity.
To avoid limiting our sample to firms that were eventually acquired, we augment the SDC database with data on firms contained in Thompson Financial's Worldscope database. This database consists of annual data on public companies in developed and emerging markets.
The combined sample contains over 7,700 firms. 12 . Table 1 summarizes key financial details of the firms used in the regressions below. All level variables are reported in million dollars and the precise definitions of accounting terms are provided in Appendix A.
The Probability of Acquisition
The first prediction of our theoretical model is that the number of cross-border acquisitions should increase during a liquidity crisis. A simple plot of the number of acquisitions supports this prediction. Figure 3 plots the number of acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign companies (solid line) summed over the five Asian countries 13 and arranged by the year in which the acquisitions were announced. 14 The dashed line reports the number of acquisitions 12 Some firms contained in Worldscope are also contained in SDC due to a previous (partial) acquisition by a foreign firm. We delete duplicate observations. 13 The country-level times series of acquisitions look substantially like the aggregated data. Two exceptions are the fact that foreign acquisitions in Indonesia are constant between 1997 and 1998 and domestic-domestic acquisitions increase in Korea in 1998. 14 Figure 3 includes all completed acquisitions. We include all purchases of the target's equity, regardless of the percentage of shares involved, as this value is missing for many acquisitions. Restricting to deals in which over fifty percent of the target's equity is purchased yields a similar picture. To explore more systematically whether liquidity is driving the patterns observed in figure 3 , we estimate a number of linear probability regressions using the panel of firms described in Section 3.2. 16 Our probability regressions take the form:
The dependent variable y jict is an indicator variable which takes the value one if firm j in industry i in country c is acquired in year t by a foreign firm, and takes the value zero 15 One may consider such nonmanufacturing sectors as agriculture and natural resources to be tradable, but these sectors are a negligible percentage of the sample. 16 We have also estimated logit and conditional logit regressions and the results stay substantially the same.
otherwise. 17 We explore acquisitions by other domestic firms in Section 3.5.2. Our regressors X are measures of firm liquidity and potential growth while D is a vector of "fixed-effect" dummy variables. We will discuss the content of X and D below. The variable D 98 is a dummy variable for the year 1998. We take that year -the first full year after the devaluations of mid-and late-1997 -as our crisis period. This year also accounts for the sharpest uptick in the number of foreign acquisitions. The number of foreign acquisitions was 13% higher in 1997 as compared to 1996 and then 70% higher in 1998 as compared to 1997. In Section 3.5.1 we explore whether the crisis includes additional years as well.
The vector δ therefore represents the change in acquisition sensitivity to firm liquidity and growth during the crisis.
Our first measure of firm liquidity is log cash flow reported for the most recent fiscal The appropriate measure for liquidity is controversial and a topic of extensive debate in the literature that examines the role of liquidity constraints on investment. 19 A major concern with the use of cash flow or sales as a measure of liquidity is that it may also be associated with other relevant (but unobserved) firm characteristics. We will correct for some of this omitted variable bias through fixed effects discussed below. To the extent that 17 SDC identifies the status of the acquisition at the date of announcement, with the vast majority of the sample being coded "Completed" or "Pending". In our probability regressions, we report results for the sample restricted to completed acquisitions only. 18 We have also used net worth as a proxy for liquidity and found results consistent with the other measures for liquidity. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the currency composition of liabilities, which would likely play a role in firm liquidity during the devaluation (see for example Aguiar (forthcoming)).
19 See Hubbard (1998) for a survey.
firm type is time varying and correlated with cash flow, higher cash flow may be associated with a higher probability of acquisition if it signals strong firm fundamentals. On the other hand, our liquidity model implies that higher cash flow should have a negative effect on the probability of being acquired, as the surplus generated from a merger is lower. To isolate the effect due to liquidity, we will compare the change in the coefficient of cash flow during the crisis year to the coefficient estimated from the rest of the sample.
Capital expenditure (investment) reported for the most recent fiscal year is used as a proxy for growth opportunities (as in Olley and Pakes (1996) ). That is, we assume that a firm that is investing in new physical capital faces relatively strong growth prospects.
We do not use the more traditional measure of Tobin's Q as many of our firm's are not However, we will compare the coefficient on cash flow for the crisis year with other years, differencing out the general correlation with omitted variables. The remaining bias, if any, will result from changes to the correlation in the crisis year (a possibility we will discuss in Section 4).
As an alternative to firm fixed effects, we also specify D to be a vector of indicator variables {D ict } representing the triplet of (industry, country, year). That is, we include indicator variables for industry (at the 3 digit sic level), country and year and all interactions of these variables. This fixed effect controls for any changes in government policies, relative prices, economic prospects and other such omitted variables that may vary across industries, countries and across time.
Note that the two alternative fixed effects, D j and D ict , imply very different regressions.
The former is essentially comparing a firm to itself over time, the latter exploits the crosssection of companies in a particular 3-digit industry in a particular country in a particular year. Despite this difference, we show below that the conclusions from the two fixed-effect specifications are substantially the same.
The model of liquidity introduced in Section 2, and summarized in statements (ii) and (iii) at the end of Section 2.1, implies δ cash flow < 0 and δ capital expenditures > 0. Table 2 reports the results of the benchmark probability regressions specified in (6). Standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering by firm are reported in parentheses. Panel I includes all completed foreign acquisitions and panel II restricts the sample to acquisitions in which the target firm is in a tradable sector. In each panel, columns (1) and (3) utilize firm and year fixed effects while (2) and (4) control for industry * nation * year interactions.
In specifications using all sectors, the dummy for 1998 interacted with liquidity is always negative, with the difference exceeding standard significance levels in two of four cases. The magnitude of the decline is similar across all specifications, as well, implying that the alternative specifications may vary in efficiency but do not reveal bias. This pattern is much stronger in both magnitudes and statistical significance in the traded sectors (panel II), which is consistent with the investment opportunities effect dominating the increased cash flow effect for tradable sector firms. While liquidity plays almost no role in predicting acquisition in noncrisis years, liquidity's effect becomes significantly more negative in 1998.
The total effect of liquidity on acquisition is significantly negative in all specifications of panel II. In 1998, a 1% decline in sales for a tradable sector firm is associated with a 0.023 percentage point increase in the probability of acquisition (Panel II column 4). The measures of liquidity used in table 2 may capture a firm size effect that is unrelated to liquidity. This is particularly relevant for specifications that do not contain a firm fixed effect. Accordingly, we perform a sensitivity analysis by scaling all variables by total assets.
We find that our results remain unchanged and have reported several specifications in To assess the quantitative importance of the drop in liquidity in driving the increase in acquisition between 1996 and 1998, consider that the unconditional (tradable sample) probability of acquisition increased from 0.4% to 3.6%, an increase of 3.2 percentage points.
Over the same period, mean log sales fell by roughly 0.34 (i.e. sales fell 34%). According to the estimated elasticity of 0.023, this drop in log sales predicts an increase in the probability of acquisition of 0.8 percentage points, or 25% of the observed increase.
Capital expenditure is intended to capture the growth prospects of a firm. The model predicts that the coefficient on this variable should increase during the crisis year. As with liquidity, the results are strongest for the tradable sectors. The baseline coefficient on capital expenditures is positive, consistent with the premise that foreign firms target relatively productive domestic firms. As predicted, the role of capital expenditure increases during the crisis year. The magnitude of the increase in this relationship during the crisis, 20 Due to the smaller sample size when restricting to firms that report assets, we have controlled for industry*country*year effects at the one-digit SIC level. The point estimates are substantially the same as for the 3-digit fixed effects but with a substantial increase in degrees of freedom.
δ capital expenditure , relative to the base coefficient tends to be large. For tradable sector firms, a 1% increase in capital expenditure is associated with a 0.025 percentage point increase in the probability of acquisition during the crisis, significantly larger than the normal period elasticity.
Price of Acquisitions
An important element of liquidity-forced sales is that constrained firms are being sold at a discount. In terms of Section 2's model, liquidity constrained firms have diminished outside options, reducing the Nash bargaining price of acquisition. Figure 5 plots the median ratio of the price of acquisition (offer price) to book value of assets against year of acquisition (solid line). The dashed line is the ratio of offer price to market price, where market price is defined as the closing share price four weeks prior to the announcement of the acquisition.
The plot clearly indicates that the price of acquired firms (relative to book value) declines dramatically in 1998. The market price also declines sharply, leaving the ratio of offer price to market price largely unchanged.
To determine whether liquidity plays a role in this price decline, we estimate for an acquired firm j in industry i in country c at time t,
The dependent variable, p jict , is the log ratio of offer price to book value reported by SDC and X, as before, represents cash flow (or sales) and capital expenditures. As before, we control for industry, time, country variations by including an indicator for each variable and all its interactions. Since we have only one price observation per firm, we cannot use firm level fixed effects. According to statements (v) and (vi) in Section 2, we should expect θ cash flow > 0 and θ capital expenditures < 0. Table 4 reports the results. Columns (1)- (3) use acquisitions in the traded sector and columns (4)- (6) use all acquisitions. 21 Consistent with our probability regressions, the effect is largest in the tradable sectors. In all specifications for the tradable sector, the evidence supports the importance of liquidity during the crisis. In particular, the base coefficients on log cash flow and log sales are never significantly different from zero. However, the interaction with the 1998 dummy is always large and significantly positive, indicating that relative liquidity in 1998 exerted an unusually strong influence on the cross-section of prices.
According to Table 4 (column 2), a 1% decline in sales is associated with a 1.74% decline in the offer price to book value for a firm acquired in the tradable sector. The normal period elasticity is 0.22.
Further Tests

Testing across Sub-periods
To test if liquidity plays a role outside of 1998, we divide our tradable sample into sub- Table 5 , indicate that 1998 is indeed a unique year.
This year is the only year in which both sales and capital expenditure enter significantly in the pattern predicted by our model. It is only in 1998 that an additional dollar of sales significantly lowers the probability of being acquired. The coefficient on sales and capital expenditure are also the largest in 1998. As one would expect of a liquidity crisis, the effects are short-lived. Table 6 explores the role of liquidity and growth in acquisitions by domestic firms of other domestic firms. Recall from figure 3 that the number of foreign acquisitions increased in 1998, while domestic-domestic acquisitions declined. Similarly, table 6 documents additional differences between the two types of acquisitions. In particular, the change in the coefficient on sales during the crisis has mixed signs, is substantially smaller in magnitude than those reported for foreign acquisitions in table 2 and not significantly different from zero. Similarly, the significantly positive increase in sensitivity to capital expenditures seen in foreign acquisitions during the crisis is not apparent in domestic acquisitions. These results suggest that liquidity considerations were more important in driving foreign-domestic acquisitions relative to domestic-domestic acquisitions.
Acquisitions by Domestic Firms
Foreign Acquisitions in Non-Crisis Economies
As a further test of our methodology, we evaluated the response of acquisitions to net sales in Singapore and Taiwan, two Asian economies that did not experience a large capital account reversal in 1997-98. In support of our tests, we found that the change in the coefficient on sales during the crisis has mixed signs, are substantially smaller in magnitude as compared to coefficients reported in columns (3) and (4) 
Discussion
An issue to bear in mind is that government policies changed in the wake of the crisis, particularly regarding foreign capital. To stem the outflow of capital, economies such as South Korea relaxed many restrictions regarding foreign direct investment while Malaysia imposed additional controls on portfolio flows. It seems likely that these regulatory changes played a significant role in raising the aggregate number of foreign acquisitions during the crisis.
Much of these reforms were implemented at the sectoral level (e.g. allowing foreign ownership of real estate, banks etc). In identifying the role played by liquidity, we therefore also rely on the cross-sectional evidence, where we include dummies for country*year*industry interactions. This controls for any regulatory change at the industry level, allowing us to identify the effects of liquidity holding constant macro policies.
22 Table not reported but available from authors on request.
In arguing that our results support a liquidity crisis interpretation of the Asian crisis, we need to consider whether alternative theories explain the same set of facts. One plausible alternative hypothesis would be that the behavior of mergers and acquisitions was in response to a shock to productivity. This would be consistent with the decline in the average sales price of acquired firms. However, this explanation (without amplification through reduced liquidity) does not square with the remainder of our results. In the terminology of Section 2, we can define a productivity crisis as a fosd shift down in the distribution of A 2 . Such a drop in productivity leads to a fall in acquisitions, which is counterfactual.
Similarly, a productivity crisis yields counterfactual implications for the coefficients in our linear probability regressions. In particular, a general decline in productivity implies an increase in the coefficient on liquidity during the crisis. The intuition rests on the fact that a productivity crisis limits investment opportunities, reducing the number of firms that are liquidity constrained (holding constant the distribution of liquidity). The fact that the coefficient on liquidity falls during the crisis runs counter to this hypothesis.
A second concern with our interpretation of the data may be the imperfect proxies for liquidity and growth potential. In particular, as noted in Section 3, cash flow is correlated with firm fundamentals other than liquidity. The firm fixed effect controls for constant firm attributes. Of course, any time-varying omitted factors that are correlated with cash flow will be reflected in the base coefficient. However, the focus of this study is the change in the coefficient during 1998, which is sensitive only to the change in the corelation between cash flow and omitted variables. While such a change in the relationship between cash flow and firm fundamentals may occur, a mechanism that produces such a change as well as accounts for the other empirical results presented above is not readily apparent.
For instance, it is plausible that cash flow serves as a signal of the underlying productivity of a firm. This signal may become more informative during a crisis, perhaps due to the fact that performance in an extreme environment yields a better signal of the strength of a firm. That is, high cash flow in a crisis becomes a very positive signal about firm fundamentals. While this would accord with the price regressions in which cash-rich firms sold at an increased premium in 1998, the negative coefficient on crisis cash flow in table   2 would then imply that the increase in acquisitions in 1998 was motivated by increased purchases of firms suddenly revealed to be low productivity. Therefore, this mechanism not only rests on the hypothesized change in correlation, but additionally and counterfactually requires that foreign firms shop for low quality partners. In general, we find hypotheses regarding cash flow as proxy for omitted fundamentals fail to plausibly explain the entire set of facts documented in this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the relationship between liquidity crises and foreign acquisition activity. We find that in the case of cross-border M&A in East Asian economies liquidity played a significant and sizeable role in explaining the dramatic increase in foreign acquisition activity and the consequent continued inflow of FDI during the Asian crisis.
Similarly, firm liquidity is shown to predict the price of acquisition, linking the sharp fall in the median price of acquisitions to the decline in liquidity observed during the crisis. The effects are most prominent in the tradable sectors. Moreover, proxies for liquidity have a greater impact on the probability of acquisition and the price of acquisition in 1998 than in other years in the sample. This is consistent with a liquidity crisis being a short-term phenomenon. Additionally, we find no consistent evidence of liquidity based acquisitions in non-crisis economies and in acquisitions by other domestic firms in crisis economies. The nature of M&A activity supports liquidity-based explanations of the East Asian crisis and provides an explanation for the surprising stability of FDI inflows during the crises.
funds, net fixed assets, intangible assets, and deferred charges, as of the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction (million US$).
Equals total liabilities plus shareholders' equity plus minority interest.
Capital Expenditure: Gross purchases of property, plant, and equipment (million US$). Does not include acquisition of other companies.
Cash Flow: SDC: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the transaction (million US$).
Worldscope: Earnings before extraordinary items and preferred and common dividends, but after operating and non-operating income and expense, reserves, income taxes, minority interest and equity in earnings, plus all non-cash charges or credits.
Cash Stock: SDC: Cash and the temporary investment of cash, including commercial paper and short-term government securities, at the end of the most recent fiscal year prior to the announcement of the transaction. Worldscope: Cash (money available for use in the normal operations of the company) plus short term investments (temporary investments of excess cash in marketable securities that can be readily converted into cash).
Liabilities: All debt and obligations owed to creditors, including all current and longterm liabilities (million US$).
Net Worth: Assets minus liabilities (million US$).
Offer Price/Book Value: Offering price in the deal divided by target's book value per share as of the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction.
Offer Price/Market Value: Premium of offer price to target trading price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date.
Sales: Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and allowances for price reductions (million US$). If not available, total revenues are used. For banks, net sales equals interest income plus non-interest income.
B The Real Exchange Rate and Acquisitions
This appendix explores how a real exchange rate depreciation would influence the pattern of M&A in the framework of section 2. Our numeraire is the price of the traded good (dollars), which is fixed at one by the world market. Let p N denote the relative price of nontradables, i.e. the real exchange rate. The production function in the text, AF (K), can be considered the reduced form of Y =ÃK β N α where N are non-traded variable inputs andÃ is total factor productivity. We restrict α + β < 1 to ensure all firms produce in equilibrium. In each period, the firm will maximize profits over the variable inputs. The production function evaluated at the optimum is then
wher p j is the price of the firm's output. The reduced form production function used in the text is obtained by replacing A = (1 − α)p
In regard to the real exchange rate, we can see that A increases during a real depreciation if the firm produces tradables (i.e. p j = 1 and p N falls). Conversely, A declines in case the firm produces nontradables (p j = p N ). The same production function applies to both periods. Therefore, a real depreciation leads to an increase in current profits (π 1 ) and future productivity (A 2 ) for a tradable sector firm and vice versa for a nontradable sector firm. The effect on acquisition is therefore ambiguous -it depends on whether the increase (decrease) in desired investment outpaces the increase (decrease) in current revenue.
C Additional Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: Define γ * ≡ {γ|S = 0} to be the fixed cost at which the surplus of a match is zero. That is,
, where we assume that γ * always lies in the interior of the support of γ. Differentiation implies
. The first term is nonnegative (and positive if the firm is constrained and Γ is increasing). The second term has the sign of Γ 00 .
In the case that γ has a uniform distribution, Γ 00 = 0. More generally, as long as Γ 00 is small over the support of γ * (which is a subset of the support of γ), then ∂ 2 y ∂l 2 ≥ 0. The usual stochastic dominance argument then implies (i) in proposition 2. Similarly,
¢ , which is strictly positive (the superscripts on K 2 indicate the capital stock under foreign and domestic ownership, respectively). Differentiating with respect to l gives:
The first term is nonpositive and strictly negative when the firm is constrained. Again, assuming that Γ is close to linear, then
≤ 0 and our stochastic dominance assumption then implies (ii).
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall that
in π raises V F and an unconstrained V D one for one by the amount of additional profit.
If constrained, V D increases by an additional (A 2 F 0 (l) − δ). Similarly, an increase inD leaves V F unchanged, but increases a constrained domestic firm by (A 2 F 0 (l) − δ). Given the concavity of F , this latter term is strictly decreasing in l over the constrained region (and zero otherwise). Therefore, ∂P ∂l is nonincreasing in l and strictly decreasing over the constrained range. Our fosd assumption then implies (i). Similarly,
, and so 
F D
A 2 and l refer to productivity and liquidity, respectively, as defined in the text. The area within the box represents the support of firms at the start of period one. The solid line represents pairs of productivity and liquidity for which the surplus of foreign acquisition is zero (drawn for a fixed γ). The shaded area denoted "F" represents firms for which acquisition is efficient; firms within the region denoted "D" remain domestically owned. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Tradable Nontradable
This figure depicts the number of completed acqusitions by foreign firms broken down by industry of acquired (target) firm. Tradable is defined as manufacturing and includes acquired firms with primary SIC code between 200 and 399. Acquired firms which list their primary industry outside this range are classified as nontradable. Note: All variables are in logs. 90% of our sample acquisitions involve the purchase of at least 10% of equity, qualifying as FDI. Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis (clustered by firm). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year*Nation*Industry fixed effects include fixed effects for each year, country and industry at the 1-digit SIC code, and all interactions of these variables. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when a domestic company is acquired by a foreign company. Acquisitions only include completed transactions and target firms with ln(assets)>1.4. This removes outlier firms that account for less than 1% of the sample. Tradable and nontradable refer to the sector of the target (acquired) firm. All industries defined as manufacturing (SIC codes 200-399) are included in tradables. 
All Sectors (4) (5) Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year*Nation*Industry fixed effects include fixed effects for each year, country and industry at the 3-digit SIC code, and all interactions of these variables. We include all acquisitions for which there is data on the price of the transaction. All industries defined as manufacturing (SIC codes 200-399) are included in tradables. Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year*Nation*Industry fixed effects include fixed effects for each year, country and industry at the 3-digit SIC code, and all interactions of these variables. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when a domestic company is acquired by a foreign company. Acquisitions only include completed transactions. Tradable and nontradable refer to the sector of the target (acquired) firm. All industries defined as manufacturing (SIC codes 200-399) are included in tradables. Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Year*Nation*Industry fixed effects include fixed effects for each year, country and industry at the 3-digit SIC code, and all interactions of these variables. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when a domestic company is acquired by another domestic company. Only completed acquisitions are included.
